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Securing the State, Undermining Democracy:  
Internationalization and Privatization of Western Militaries 
ABSTRACT 
Changes in the field of security since the 1990s triggered off a number of still continu-
ing military transformations in liberal democracies. Since their armed forces were de-
signed for the purposes of the bipolar Cold war security constellation, they have been 
“redesigned” according to the new tasks as agreed upon in the new NATO strategic 
concepts or the assignments for the Europeanized forces within the European Union: 
Conflict prevention, crisis intervention, counter-terrorism have been added to the range 
of deployment missions. This recent transformation of the armed forces  is pushed a-
head in the political spirit of new public management well known from other policy 
areas in the OECD countries. The proclaimed reforms are guided by efficiency and ef-
fectiveness principles only, issues of democratic control and integration of the armed 
forces into the society are marginalized in the political discourse. But integration and 
cooperation within international organizations is only one of the two trends detrimental 
to democratic control of the military; increasing contracting with Private Security and 
Military Companies is the other. Contracting is intended to reduce political and finan-
cial costs and risks for Western governments. The authors argue that, in the long run, 
both trends of privatization and internationalization, though they seem to run into oppo-
site directions from a purely etatist perspective, result in the joint effect of exacerbating 
democratic control and accountability of security policies. This point is illustrated by 
the employment of private military companies by the US government agencies and US 
military and the reform of the German armed forces. 
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Securing the State, Undermining Democracy:  
Internationalization and Privatization of Western Militaries 
1. INTERNATIONALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION TRENDS IN SECURITY 
POLITICS SINCE THE 1990S1 
Since the 1990s, international security and defense politics have undergone some re-
markable structural changes. Under the umbrella of a turn to governance, security and 
defense have taken quite different shapes. Increasingly, the organization of security 
politics has been internationalized at least within the OECD world (Jachtenfuchs 2005; 
Krahmann 2003). With the ‘Headline Goals’ from 1999 and the decision to establish 
integrated ‘Battle Groups’ in 2004 the European Security and Defense Policy is setting 
up an integrated European military command and control structure (Wagner 2005). 
Similarly, the NATO Response Force and new NATO doctrines rely on a harmonization 
in weapons procurement, military strategies and tactics. Finally, one should mention the 
increase in multilateral interventions and of counter-terrorism strategies of the United 
Nations (Biersteker 2004), all aiming to further integrate national security policies and 
politics. On the other hand, these patterns of internationalization are flanked by a grow-
ing privatization within security politics. Increasingly, OECD states have come to share 
security provision with private actors in public-private partnerships between govern-
ments, International Organizations and private business actors to regulate certain prac-
tices (Cutler et al. 1999; Wolf et al. 2007), or they outsource tasks and functions to Pri-
vate Security and Military Companies (PSMCs) as part of military interventions, in 
post-conflict-reconstruction or in military training and advice (Avant 2005; Singer 
2008). 
Our paper aims to shed light on the kind of effects these rather diffuse trends have 
for the national security and defense politics and policies of Western democracies. Do 
they already ring the death knell to the state monopoly of force which is to be pulver-
ized between internationalization and privatization? To the contrary, one might argue 
that these trends rather indicate the emergence of an innovative and effective state or-
ganization of security policy. Philipp Genschel and Bernhard Zangl thus hold that the 
denationalization of political authority (i.e. internationalization and privatization) does 
not disband the state. The state changes its role. Instead of monopolizing the resources 
of political authority, it now manages and provides the ‘complementary resources that 
                                                 
1  We would like to thank Philipp Genschel, Bernhard Zangl, Anna Leander, Lothar Brock, Christopher Daase, 
Claire Cutler, Klaus Dieter Wolf and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of 
this paper. 
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non-state actors need to exercise political authority effectively and legitimately’ (Gen-
schel/Zangl 2008: 22). Is the ‘Leviathan’ thus simply adapting his profile, becoming a 
manager of political authority instead of his monopolist (Genschel/Zangl 2008: 2), or is 
he sacrificing his core by transferring his monopoly of force to international institutions 
and private actors alike?  
The fundamental, but still somewhat diffuse changes in security politics can be 
grasped once one turns to national military and defense politics where they function like 
a catalyst for concrete transformation projects of military and defense politics within 
Western democratic states. We focus on two such concrete transformation projects and 
analyze their consequences for the role of the state in security politics, in particular the 
state organization of military and defense politics and policies. Our analysis contrasts 
the initiative of the United States to transform its military force by outsourcing military 
functions to PSMCs since the mid 1990s with the ongoing transformation of the Ger-
man armed forces (Bundeswehr) from a territorial defense army to an intervention 
army.2 These cases are chosen since both countries are representative for a particular 
type of transformation. Although internationalization and privatization are to some ex-
tent present in both transformation projects, each displays a clear tendency in one direc-
tion. While (Western) Germany’s foreign and security policy has for decades been 
noted for its high degree of integration into a broad range of multilateral settings,3 which 
is also reflected in the current transformation of the Bundeswehr, the United States are 
known to be critical of internationalization and appear as a frontrunner in privatization 
aims dating back at least to the 1950s government’s policy which basically held that 
government should not compete with its citizens (Urey 2005: 4).4 
These contrasting trends seem to point in different directions. While the German 
transformation project implies a strengthening of the state monopoly in security politics, 
the US strategy suggests its weakening. In fact, neither restructuring project does (yet) 
result in a significant weakening of the state monopoly of force; however, both relax its 
democratic bonds. Traveling on a dominant discourse of ‘effectiveness’ and ‘effi-
ciency’, a technique of political authority is materializing which aims at increasing the 
flexibility and autonomy of decision-makers but which also step-by-step weakens the 
                                                 
2  An ‚army on operations’ (‘Armee im Einsatz’) as the German Ministry of Defense labels it. 
3  With regard to the European integration Jeffrey Anderson (1997: 85) once noted a distinctive German ‘reflexive 
support for an exaggerated multilateralism’; in a similar vein Peter Katzenstein (1997: 19-29) observed that a 
‘highly internationalized state identity’ is one of the characteristics of Germany’s policy profile. For a critical dis-
cussion of Germany’s multilateralism see Baumann (2006). 
4  Our focus in this paper is on the effects of the respective transformation projects and not on the question of why 
different countries select specific types of transformations. 
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democratic and legal constraints on the use of force, whether intentionally or not.5 
Surely, military and defense policies belong to the core domains of the executive, in 
which democratic control mechanisms and practices have always been comparatively 
weaker than in other policy fields. Hence all the more important is a critical social sci-
ence analysis of the consequences of these developments for fundamental issues of 
domination and power of and within the state. 
We develop our argument in several steps: Firstly, we outline the development of the 
modern state and the monopoly of force and briefly sketch the recent changes of secu-
rity threats and politics (part 2). Then we investigate the outsourcing initiative of the US 
military (part 3) and contrast it with the transformation of the German armed forces and 
the tying of German security policies to the European framework of the ESDP (part 4). 
Seeming contradictory at first glance, both projects imply similar effects. Traveling on a 
dominant discourse of ‘effectiveness’ and ‘efficiency’, we observe a selective strength-
ening of the state monopoly of force: State executives are empowered at the expense of 
democratic legitimating processes. The diagnosis of a change of the state from a mo-
nopolist of political authority to its manager is thus not only semantically related to the 
technocratic governance perspective voiced by governments to garner support for their 
restructuring projects; it suffers from the same problem as well: input-legitimacy falls 
by the wayside the more emphasis is one-sidedly put on output. 
2. THE STATE AND (INTERNATIONAL) SECURITY  
2.1 Civilizing the State Monopoly of Force 
Historically, the establishment of the monopoly of force is among the first characteris-
tics in the formation of the modern nation state (Giddens 1987; Thomson 1994; Grimm 
2002) in Western Europe, associated with the consolidation of the territorial state (Leib-
fried/Zürn 2005: 5f). Nevertheless it has taken centuries for the state to eliminate private 
competitors in the use of force to establish this monopoly, which was never empirically 
uncontested.6 Once established, however, security by the state comprised internal secu-
                                                 
5  The weakening of democratic control mechanisms, which we observe, is not necessarily intended by governments 
but at times also results as a side-effect from their attempts to increase flexibility in times of scarce resources and 
financial strains (we will address this point in the concluding section). 
6  Private actors never completely vanished from the field of security (Grimm 2002: 1301), they appeared in the 
forms of privateering or chartered companies during the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries (Wolf 2009; Ortiz 2007), the 
mercenary activities that varied during the centuries (Thomson 1994) or private support personnel accompanying 
the state’s armed forces at all times (Schaller 2007). 
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rity (criminal law and policing) and external security (international law and the mili-
tary). 
Over the centuries, the monopoly of force has undergone several developments 
which sum up to a firstly legal (the constitutional state) and later democratic civilization 
(the democratic state) of the use of force (Leibfried/Zürn 2005). The monopoly has 
changed to be understood as a monopoly on the legitimate use of force which not only 
connotes the idea that only states can legitimately resort to force but also that they are 
legitimated to do so given a legal framework and democratic processes defining the 
conditions of the use of force (Grimm 2002: 1298-1302). In many accounts, most para-
digmatically in Max Weber’s (1972), security lies at the heart of the modern state, not 
only because it came first in its formation but also because of its potential effects on 
society and the individual. Security renders the Janus face of the state most explicit, 
being the protector of society but also its greatest threat since it has the power to 
unleash unlimited violence upon it (Leibfried/Zürn 2005: 4). Legal embeddedness and 
democratic process restrain this power but they do not eliminate it. It is thus not surpris-
ing that we are particularly irritated by internationalization and privatization trends 
within the field of security as they give rise to worries about an unleashing of this power 
to destroy. Democratic control and legal embeddedness are supposed to civilize the le-
viathan. While that was hardly ever completely realized, the current trends even seem to 
readily accept this unraveling.  
2.2 Changes in International Security  
For a long period, the dominant problem of international security was perceived to be 
that of inter-state war. Consequently, international security policies focused on the pre-
vention or resolution of inter-state conflicts. However, with the end of the Cold War, the 
effects of globalization and denationalization already present in many other policy fields 
began to materialize in security as well. In this context, even the understanding of secu-
rity began to change, comprising increasingly non-military threats such as transnational 
crime, terrorism, gross human rights violations, epidemics, migration or environmental 
threats (Hampson et al. 2002). Security no longer focused solely on the survival of the 
state but also on individuals, as is expressed in the notion of ‘human security’ or the 
establishment of a ‘responsibility to protect’ (Brock 2004; ICISS 2001). Among other 
factors, the enlarged concept of security is a reflection of changes in the nature of con-
flicts and warfare which states and the international community are facing today. The 
once predominant inter-state conflicts have decreased since World War II while intra-, 
sub- and non-state conflicts have generally gained in importance and make up for about 
90 percent of all wars today (Chojnacki 2006).  
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Many of these conflicts share some basic characteristics, which have led many to dub 
them ‘new wars’ (Kaldor 1999; Münkler 2002). Among these characteristics are the 
blurring of combatants and non-combatants since conflict parties are often non-state 
actors who do not have an organized or uniformed military, and since conflict parties do 
change quite frequently during conflicts because they split up in rival groups and re-
align in different patterns. Furthermore, the civilian population is often directly targeted 
in these armed conflicts, which are in many cases conducted with light weapons and 
guerilla tactics, and political and economic motifs of fighting are sometimes hard to 
distinguish. War economies have emerged in which fighting seems to be motivated by 
the chance to gain economic wealth, not political control of a territory. Often, these con-
flicts take place within or fuel weak or failing state structures leaving even the supply of 
basic security functions by the state questionable, and, finally, they tend to spread to 
neighboring regions resulting in trans-national or regional conflict systems like in West 
Africa or the Balkans region (Duffield 2001; Reno 2000).  
In total, one could speak of a trend of a denationalization of security threats that 
states and the international community are confronted with today. These general 
changes within security policies have certainly supported the trends to internationaliza-
tion and privatization of security and defense policies of Western democracies respec-
tively. Given the spread of domestic turmoil and conflict, often associated with state 
failure, not to mention the rise of transnational terrorism, military interventions in con-
flicts have not only increased in number but have also changed their character (Cho-
jnacki 2006). Multinational interventions (partly even without an explicit UN-mandate) 
by NATO or changing ‘coalitions of the willing’ of mostly Western democracies domi-
nate (Geis et al. 2006). Additionally, interventions have become more complex and re-
quire often long-term commitments with regard to post-conflict reconstruction. 
The NATO states thus actively contributed to the change of international security 
politics by their military interventions, which, in turn, entail repercussions on their own 
state organizations. Since the 1990s they have been submitting their armed forces to a 
so-called transformation,7 which is supposed to effect changes in technology, doctrine, 
                                                 
7  The concept of ‚transformation’ was shaped by the US administration of George W. Bush in their first months in 
office. For reasons of public relations, the new government sought to distance themselves from their predecessor 
administration under President Clinton, who had proclaimed a ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA) in the 
1990s. In central aspects, however, RMA and transformation refer basically to the same: the equipment of the 
armed forces with modern high-tech and communications electronics and correspondingly adapted modes and 
concepts of warfare (Helmig/Schörnig 2008a: 12). The US government expected this transformation to endow 
their troops with ‚revolutionary’ or asymmetric advantages in the full range of military operations (Collmer 2007: 
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strategies, organization and structures of the militaries in order to enable them to cover 
the whole mission spectrum from crisis prevention, peace keeping, over peace enforce-
ment and stabilization, to combating terrorism as well as to large-scale warfare 
(Helmig/Schörnig 2008). But while the US government has been pushing the high-tech 
transformation of its armed forces on the basis of a gigantic defense budget, the Euro-
pean militaries still remain far behind such ambitions – not only for sheer financial re-
straints but also since the European governments have accentuated different aspects of 
their transformation strategies especially within the framework of the European Security 
and Defense Policy (Grotto/Bergmann 2008). Despite such differences between NATO 
states, the restructuring aims at reaching military dominance within quite diverse mis-
sion scenarios by inducing increased flexibility, quick deployability and high mobility 
as well as an improved interconnectedness of all military units and weapons systems by 
way of technological innovations. Internationalization (integration of strategies, doc-
trines, procurement) and privatization (outsourcing functions to Private Security and 
Military Companies, PSMCs) are two strategies to reach these goals. Both are part and 
parcel of the transformation strategies of military and defense politics, even though 
states differ in their national choices how to adopt these strategies. 
3. WEAKENING THE STATE MONOPOLY OF FORCE? OUTSOURCING AND 
PRIVATIZATION TO PSMCS IN THE USA 
Outsourcing and contracting with PSMCs is a global phenomenon albeit not an evenly 
dispersed one. It is most advanced in the Anglo-Saxon countries and unmatched in the 
United States.8  
For the most part, PSMCs are regular business companies who offer specialized se-
curity services to a variety of clients on a global or regional market. Most of them have 
a professional management; they are legally registered and sometimes even traded on 
the stock markets (Singer 2008; O’Brien 2000). Contrary to what one could expect 
given the hotly debated appearances of some early companies, e.g. Executive Outcomes 
or Sandline International in Angola and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, direct involvement 
in combat constitutes a negligible part of the kind of security services these companies 
offer (Deitelhoff 2008). Their main business areas belong to direct or indirect combat 
support. They offer logistics (housing, transportation, amenities), intelligence (interro-
                                                                                                                                               
28). The goal as it was stated in the Joint Vision 2020 by the Ministry of Defense in 2000 was ‘full spectrum 
dominance’. 
8  The United States might be unparalleled in its rate of outsourcing but it is not without followers. The govern-
ments of France, the UK, and Israel are working with PSMCs, former CIS-countries’ militaries are being trained 
by PSMCs to follow NATO-standards (Krahmann 2007; Avant 2007b: 424). 
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gation, satellite surveillance and analysis), training and advice (risk-management, train-
ing of Special Forces, police, army), personal, convoy and facility security and, finally, 
the whole range of weapons system development, procurement, maintenance and opera-
tion (Spearin 2001; Avant 2007b: 424). In these areas, the private security industry is 
still growing at astonishing rates. 
Despite the industry’s steady development since the early 1990s there is still a lack 
of reliable numbers and figures. Given the fluidity of the market, of firms dissolving 
and recreating themselves, we miss data as to the actual number of companies, the sum 
of their employees or the annual turnover of the industry. Given different sources we 
can probably estimate that about 200-300 different PSMCs are currently active in more 
than 90 countries (Bures 2005: 535; Singer 2008). The annual market revenue of the 
private security industry is purported to increase at a level of eight per cent per year und 
is supposed to currently lie between 100 and 200 Billion US-Dollar (Von Boehmcken 
2007: 261f; Singer 2008: 78). Especially, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have been a 
boost for the industry. The General Accounting Office of the United States for example 
estimates that about 180 PSMCs are currently working in Iraq (GAO 2006b: 2), offering 
their services to the coalition troops, the Iraqi government, international organizations, 
humanitarian organizations and local and transnational businesses as well. Figures 
available for Afghanistan project approximately 90 PSMCs operating there (Jo-
ras/Schuster 2008: 11).  
3.1 Transformation by Privatization:  
The outsourcing initiative in the United States  
Remarkably, in almost all new security strategies of Western states privatization strate-
gies have found their place, albeit in varying degrees. Privatization strategies are strong-
est in the United States which started its recent outsourcing initiative already in the mid 
1990s. The 1996 Pentagon report on ‘Improving the Combat Edge through Outsourc-
ing’ held that ‘Experience in DoD [Department of Defence; the authors] on the private 
sector consistently and unambiguously demonstrates how the competitive force of out-
sourcing can generate savings and improve performance’ (DoD 1996). The US Air 
Force even propagated a ‘Revolution in Business Affairs’ at its 50th anniversary which it 
wanted to implement by an aggressive privatization of all relevant areas (Air Force 
1997). Similarly, former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered in 2001 that all 
areas that were not necessary to be provided by DoD should be outsourced and privat-
ized to increase efficiency and effectiveness (Rumsfeld 2001). 
To be sure, outsourcing to private contractors is not novel to the US forces but has a 
long tradition (Zamparelli 1999). With the recent outsourcing initiative, however, the 
breadth and degree of outsourcing within the US-military has changed dramatically. 
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While privatization was confined to non-critical support functions apart from theater 
before, nowadays PSMCs are all over the place, working alongside regular soldiers in 
theater as well. Already a third of all US-weapons systems are depending on private 
contractors and this number is steadily increasing (Blizzard 2004; Singer 2008: 247). It 
is not only the sheer number of weapon systems relying on private contractor support 
that is astonishing but the change in doctrine underlying outsourcing. While the former 
doctrine held that forces were to develop organic capabilities for maintenance and op-
erations of new weapons systems as soon as possible, nowadays maintenance for non-
critical weapons systems should be outsourced for life and for critical systems for at 
least four years (Zamparelli 1999: 14). This shift in practices and doctrines does not 
only apply to weapons maintenance, training and operation in theater, but also to other 
sectors in which PSMCs are on the rise. They provide nearly the complete logistics of 
US troops deployed abroad, ranging from housing to postal services and transportation. 
Similarly, they guard military facilities, convoys and diplomats and have even taken 
over large portions of military police functions (cf. GAO 2003; Blizzard 2004; Peter-
sohn 2006). Finally, they support intelligence, interrogations and are the main actors to 
train foreign military and police forces on behalf of the US, for example, the Iraq secu-
rity forces (Krahmann 2007).  
Depending on different estimates, up to 190.000 private contractors are currently op-
erating in Iraq (GAO 2006b: 2; Singer 2008: 245; CBO 2008: 15). However, Iraq is not 
unique. About 25.000 PSMC employees are operating in Afghanistan and they are 
prevalent in many other conflicts and post-conflict-settings as well (Joras/Schuster 
2008: 12).9 Contracts of US government agencies between 2003 and 2007 with contrac-
tors only for the Iraq theater sum up to a number between 10 to 85 Billion US dollars 
(CBO 2008). The large variance results from the wide or narrow definition applied to 
private contractors. A narrow definition includes only armed security services, a broader 
one also logistics and reconstruction. No matter how we define contractors, it is clear 
that there is no historical precedent to this presence of private contractors in military 
theater, amounting to a 1: 1 ratio between military personnel and contractors (CBO 
2008: 12). But even if we consider the narrow definition of armed contractors, deliver-
ing military security services, we end up at a conservative number of about 30.000 em-
ployees (CBO 2008: 14).10 Putting this in perspective, the ratio between US military 
                                                 
9  In Angola, studies report that since 2002 PSMC numbers have increased to about 100 companies present and 
working. See Joras/Schuster (2008: 47). 
10  The number is certainly too low as the respective agencies (US Aid, DoD, State Department) do not have accu-
rate numbers on their contractors (Isenberg 2007; GAO 2006a). 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 92) 
- 9 - 
personnel and PSMC employees has changed from 50: 1 in the first Gulf war (1991) to 
10: 1 in the Iraq war of 2003 (Isenberg 2007: 83) and to a 6: 1 in 2008. 
As sketched out above, the outsourcing initiative is heralded by decision-makers to 
increase flexibility and to decrease the costs of security and military policies. The first 
idea is easily explained. All major states have decreased their troop sizes significantly 
after the end of the Cold War (Zamparelli 1999; Petersohn 2006). With a general in-
crease in military interventions in the 1990s and the US ‘global war on terror’ since 
2001 they experienced severe problems to live up to their military commitments. Thus, 
outsourcing security services to PSMCs was one strategy to ensure flexibility, to allevi-
ate troop overstretch and to allow for rapid response capabilities as PSMCs can rapidly 
deploy forces and quickly relocate them when necessary. Accordingly, the Department 
of Defense (DoD) argued: ‘We must be prepared to fight and win two nearly simultane-
ous regional conflicts. These conflicts are often described as ‘come as you are’ wars, 
meaning that there will be little lead time for mobilization or surge of production capa-
bility. They will require rapid transportation, tailored and flexible maintenance support 
and greater reliance on private sector suppliers’ (DoD 1996: 1). In line with that, the 
turn to high-technology weapon systems and network centric warfare that is visible in 
most Western democracies but is most advanced within the United States increased the 
need of private support for weapon maintenance and operation even further (Zamparelli 
1999: 11; Schörnig 2007).  
The second argument reflects the general belief – highlighted by phrases such as 
‘new public management’ or the ‘lean state' (Muthien/Taylor 2002: 183; Singer 2008) – 
that privatization decreases the costs of services. Private actors do not have large bu-
reaucracies; they face competition on a market and can better specialize on specific ser-
vices. Furthermore, PSMCs have only to be paid for the time of their contract. In con-
trast to regular forces, states can save on training, education, maintenance and pensions. 
Obviously, the US perceives of outsourcing to PSMCs as an effective tool of foreign 
policy to increase its flexibility. What appears as a weakening of the state thus seems to 
turn out to be a strategy to strengthen state control on and exercise of the monopoly of 
force. This fits into recent studies which find that cost-savings are hardly realized by 
outsourcing in the US (GAO 2006a: 4; GAO 2008; Schreier/Caparini 2005: 98). Basi-
cally, there is hardly any data that supports the argument that privatization and out-
sourcing of security generate cost-savings (Isenberg 2006: 155). Even though figures 
are abundant which calculate cost-savings, most of these figures rather represent estima-
tions of cost-savings not realized cost-savings (see Wulf 2005: 190f; Avant 2005: 117f; 
Singer 2008: 157). Instead, recent figures report that outsourcing increases the cost of 
military functions (see GAO 2006 a, b, GAO 2008: 8-15). There are two major reasons 
for this: One is the contract market environment of outsourcing in security, the other is 
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the political environment of military interventions and crises. The possibility of cost-
saving by privatization depends on several conditions. Firstly, a transparent and com-
petitive market is needed, so that clients can pick and choose among different suppliers. 
Secondly, contracts must be subject to transparent bidding procedures, competing offers 
must be systematically compared and the performance of suppliers on the contract terms 
has to be closely monitored, and, if necessary, sanctioned (Markusen 2003; Singer 
2004). However, none of these characteristics seem to apply to the current situations of 
contracting (Dickinson 2007). Only 40 per cent of all contracts of US government agen-
cies (between 1998 and 2003) were subject to bidding and since then the numbers have 
only slightly increased (Singer 2008).11 Above that, more than 50 per cent of all con-
tracts have not been monitored at all (Dickinson 2007: 226). These numbers explain 
why so many companies that have a record of bad practice and financial fraud or are 
accused of serious human rights violations were again rewarded contracts, among them 
Halliburton, CACI, Titan or latest Blackwater (see also Dickinson 2007: 219f). 
One reason for this is that the market for private security services is only partially 
competitive, while some quasi-monopolies exist (for instance in certain areas of logis-
tics; see Chesterman/Lehnardt 2007: 254; Cockayne 2007). Additionally, the market is 
also very fluid. Companies quickly dissolve and re-establish under different names and 
locations, making it difficult to trace wrong-doers. The majority of PSMCs is rather 
small. They are nearly virtual companies which rely on huge rosters of potential em-
ployees that they hire whenever a new contract comes in. Thus, they are very flexible 
and can locate and re-locate whenever necessary (Dickinson 2007). In line with that, the 
widespread practice of sub-contracting in the market reduces transparency even further 
(Wulf 2005: 70). 
Secondly, the political environment of situations of military interventions and crises 
are probably among the least likely environments to favour cost-savings. Situations of 
military interventions are usually characterized by secrecy, heavy time constraints and 
the imperative of military victory. Thus, there is hardly time for neither complex bid-
ding procedures nor the transparency available to assess contract performances. Fur-
thermore, military commanders usually calculate for worst case scenarios thus always 
having a back-up at hand, a strategy that is hardly cost-saving in contracting (Singer 
2008: 163). This explains not only the high number of non-competitive contracts but 
also the widespread practice of so called cost-plus contracts, i.e. contracts, in which the 
rewards increase with the costs (Singer 2004).  
                                                 
11  See Center for Public Integrity (www.publicintegrity.org/pns/report.aspx?aid 385). Other governments do not 
fare much better. A new study on Canada’s military contracting concludes that only 60 per cent of all contracts 
were competitive and that this number was decreasing (Staples 2007). 
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Another cost increasing factor is the coordination problem arising from the presence 
of private contractors in military theater. First, employees of PSMCs on a contract with 
a conflict party usually remain outside the command chain and are not allowed to take 
part in hostilities in conflict as they are regarded as civilians under International Hu-
manitarian Law. However, in most of the military interventions today the differentiation 
between frontline and hinterland blurs, bringing PSMCs who are most active in logis-
tics, site and convoy security and weapon maintenance ever closer to theater and to an 
active participation in hostilities (Schaller 2007). This enhances their risks to become a 
target of military attacks and calls upon the regular forces to extend their protection to 
these companies thus leading to higher coordination costs. Additionally, coordination is 
needed to prevent conflicts between the regular forces and the PSMCs. Incidents of so-
called blue-on-white fire in Iraq, i.e. accidental attacks between US forces and the con-
tractors, indicates how difficult that is (GAO 2005: 28; GAO 2006a).  
This seems to imply that privatization and outsourcing are not primarily driven by 
cost reduction considerations. Rather, the US seems to be willing to accept even a rise 
in costs. A telling example for this is that although the number of contracts has greatly 
increased since 2001, the US-government has simultaneously reduced the number of 
controllers and ombudsmen to supervise contracts (Singer 2008: 252). Secondly, not 
only the United States but the majority of Western states eschew the possibilities to 
strengthen the international regulation of PSMCs, which would allow them to better 
track wrong-doers and to further competition and a transparent market. States have not 
only shied away from attempts to set up a UN convention on the banning of these com-
panies, they have also not agreed on a binding licensing system. The only existing regu-
latory framework for companies is the Montreux-document from September 2008, 
which is a non-binding declaration, signed by 17 states, among them the US, UK, 
France and Germany. The document has two parts, the first ‘merely’ recalling the legal 
obligations arising for PSMCs under international law and the second part displaying a 
list of best practices states should adhere to in working with PSMCs.12 
Obviously, cost-saving is not the primary focus of the US in hiring PSMCs but it is 
rather their utility as a flexible policy tool in pursuing security policy. This would also 
explain the weak national regulations systems PSMCs are usually subject to. The na-
tional licensing system in the United States primarily regulates and thus controls the 
export of security services. It regulates the conditions under which PSMCs are allowed 
to work for what foreign client, not for their home government.13 Such regulations rather 
                                                 
12  See Montreux-Document at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/montreux-document-170908. 
13  Other governments do not even have such systems in place, e.g. Great Britain or Germany. 
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ensure that PSMCs support the foreign policy goals of their government and not that 
they save costs (cf. Schneiker 2007: 408).  
Overall, the discussion so far suggests that privatization and outsourcing do not (yet) 
amount to a substantial weakening of the state monopoly of force. They should rather be 
seen as a variation of the state’s exercise of it. The USA outsource services basically to 
generate more flexibility thus highlighting that it perceives of PSMCs not as a threat to 
its monopoly but as an innovative strategy to exercise it. However, a look at the effects 
on the legitimation process discloses a different picture. To reveal this, a closer look is 
needed as to whom remains in control over the exercise of force within the state. The 
flexibility that outsourcing promises for states is essentially a promise directed to the 
executive and not to the legislative and the public more generally (Deitelhoff/Geis 2007 
a, b; Deitelhoff/Wolf 2009). 
3.2 Flexibility and democratic legitimacy 
State governments’ reluctance to strengthen the regulation of PSMCs discussed above is 
not only out of convenience but it is by design as governments want to increase their 
flexibility vis-à-vis their parliaments and publics alike. PSMCs allow for a covert for-
eign policy not consensual among the national public and/or the international commu-
nity and they generally enhance the power of governments in relation to their parlia-
ments (Avant 2007a: 184-187, 2005: 60). 
Outsourcing to PSMCs helps governments to hide the extent of their military en-
gagement abroad from their respective publics and legislatures (Cockayne 2007: 212). 
Governments can and do circumvent troop ceilings ordered by parliaments, thus freeing 
soldiers for war making, a strategy which the US government has used in the Balkans 
conflicts and again in its Plan Colombia (Avant 2005: 128; Singer 2008: 211-215). Sec-
ondly, governments can manipulate the public opinion on their foreign policy. Research 
on democratic peace has shown that popular consent to military operations is a function 
of the prospect of military victory and the safety of one’s own soldiers (Schörnig 2007). 
Democratic publics are casualty averse, but PSMC casualties are not listed in official 
casualty statistics. Public debates about the estimated 1001 PSMC casualties in Iraq 
have at least been absent.14 Most importantly, contracts are usually negotiated with by 
the executive.15 Parliaments have only limited insight in contractual contents or/and are 
often unaware of these contracts as they are hidden in several titles in defense budgets 
                                                 
14  See list at: icasualties.org/oif/Civ.asp; 09.11.2008. The list only reports 426 names but refers to 1001 as a gov-
ernment-based number. 
15  US Congress only needs to be involved in contract negotiations if the contract volume exceeds a limit of 50 Mil-
lion US dollar (Schneiker 2007: 414). 
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(Singer 2004: 10, 17; Schreier/Caparini 2005: 102). Furthermore, the general practice of 
sub-contracting makes parliamentary oversight even more difficult. This illustrates the 
fact that the US Congress still has no accurate data on the number of contractors work-
ing on behalf of the US in Iraq (GAO 2006a: 4).  
Strengthening regulations on PSMCs would therefore increase political costs: 
Strengthening monitoring and transparency and clarifying responsibilities and liabilities 
would make the activities of PSMCs more visible for the public and legislatures alike, 
thus lowering significantly the discretionary powers of executives.16 Hence, govern-
ments do not have much of an interest in regulating PSMCs as their advantages are tied 
to the fact that their activities are less visible and weakly regulated (see also Cockayne 
2007: 206). It is no mistake that it is rather the PSMCs themselves than governments 
who argue for national binding regulation, if only to secure their market position 
(Schneiker 2007: 407f; Dickinson 2007: 230). Regulatory initiatives only follow public 
pressure. The series of incidents in Iraq, starting with the involvement of PSMC em-
ployees in torture at Abu Ghraib and reinforced by the Blackwater shootings of civilians 
in fall 2007, have greatly increased public awareness of PSMCs and pressure to step up 
to regulate their conduct and to punish offences.17 Only after public outrage and under 
enormous pressure by congress, the US government has started to close legal gaps,18 
such as extending jurisdiction to civilian contractors working for DoD agencies and 
lately also for those working for the State Department and other US agencies.19 
Basically, what becomes clear is that outsourcing does affect the state organization of 
force, however not directly and not in the short run. While it does not directly weaken 
the state monopoly of force, it is effectively undermining its legitimation basis. Still, 
outsourcing may lead to a weakening of the state monopoly of force in the long run. The 
higher the rate of outsourcing is, the greater the risk for the state of losing generic re-
                                                 
16  See also Avant/Sigelman (2008), who analyzed the (amount and type of) media coverage of PSMCs in Iraq com-
pared to coverage of US military. 
17  However, incidents did not start with Iraq. DynCorp employees were involved in sex trafficking in Bosnia in the 
1990s. In Angola, PSMC employees are accused of torturing and even killing mine workers and in Colombia 
PSMCs are accused of a whole range of abuses and crimes (Singer 2008: 251; Grofe 2007: 243). Iraq only differs 
from previous PSMC operations by the higher frequency and visibility of incidents.  
18  Similar dynamics can be observed in Great Britain, where coordination between PSMCs and the government is 
largely informal. Tighter regulation has only been discussed after scandalizations and public outcry. The famous 
’green paper’ on regulation of PSMCs of the British government was solely a reaction to the ’Arms to Africa’ af-
fair in which the British PSMC Sandline International had delivered arms to Sierra Leone, grossly violating exist-
ing arms embargos, but nevertheless implicitly supported by (parts of) the government (see Avant 2007b: 438f). 
19  See Jane’s Defence Weekly (10.01.2007: 5). 
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sources to exercise its monopoly. This is already visible within the United States. In 
certain areas such as logistics, concerns within the forces are rising as the US forces 
have lost generic capabilities, meaning that they are reliant on private contractors to 
perform these functions (Avant 2005: 133; Zamparelli 1999). The renewing of the logis-
tics-contract with Halliburton although the company was repeatedly accused of overbill-
ing highlights this risk. The US military simply had no own resources to take over logis-
tics on their own (Schreier/Caparini 2005; Deitelhoff 2008).20  
That problem is not limited to resources, but concerns also manpower and expertise. 
Experts warn that in vital areas such as military training (Avant 2005: 116-120; Isen-
berg 2006: 156), weapons maintenance and operation (Petersohn 2006: 21; Zamparelli 
1999) as well as military policing (Avant 2005: 127); the US has lost generic compe-
tences (Blizzard 2004). The more certain areas are privatized, the more the military ex-
periences a brain drain as well (Avant 2005: 134f). PSMCs rely on their well-trained 
employees to be attractive companies for states. They recruit these, however, in the spe-
cial forces of state militaries, such as green berets or delta forces. The US military has 
already started to work with stop-loss programs to counter this strain of expertise in the 
force structure and to prevent that their best officers can directly be hired by the private 
sector. Furthermore, it has started to grant high-ranking officers huge monetary rewards 
to convince them to stay in the forces. Again, this is not a problem unique to the US. 
Australia grants its officers a one year sabbatical to give them the chance to profit from 
the much higher salaries in the private sector but to return afterwards (Singer 2008: 
257).  
These problems and the reactions to it suggest that not all of these effects might be 
intentionally driven. With multiple military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, US 
military capabilities were stretched to their limits and further outsourcing became vital 
to support the military missions. Thus, the recent rush in privatization, often referred to 
as the Iraq bubble, should not be portrayed as a grand design of vicious decision-makers 
to disempower their legislatives but also as a result of ad-hoc decisions satisfying needs 
and demands as they came along. 
                                                 
20  Given the threat of a dependence of the forces on private contractors DoD has ordered that the forces need to 
have back-up plans if contractors drop out. However, the General Accounting Office has repeatedly warned that 
these back-up plans were either non-existent (GAO 2003: 16) or insufficient (GAO 2006 a, b). A problem that 
popped up again after the Blackwater shooting and subsequent prohibition of the firm’s operation by the Iraqi 
government. Blackwater is responsible for the protection of the State Department diplomats. Thus, the US-
government pressured the Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Maliki to lift the prohibition on Blackwater as the State De-
partment had no back-up and was dependent on Blackwater’s services. 
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4. STRENGTHENING THE STATE: THE EXAMPLE OF GERMANY 
As we have indicated in the introduction of this paper, the transformation of the German 
armed forces Bundeswehr does also include elements of outsourcing, but the more sub-
stantial restructuring effects stem from the further internationalization of German secu-
rity policies. As a part of its broader transformation since the 1990s, the Bundeswehr 
has been going through a so-called economic modernization process that is primarily 
driven by fiscal considerations and directed at the reduction of the relatively high opera-
tional costs. This economic modernization process, which will be described in more 
detail below, also comprises some privatization strategies and ‘public-private-
partnerships’ initiated by Defense Minister Scharping in the late 1990s.21 In contrast to 
the USA, however, German privatization initiatives are mainly confined to the so-called 
supportive service segment at home (such as vehicle fleet, clothing or logistics ser-
vices), whereas the military core capabilities22, not least due to provisions of the German 
Basic Law, are excluded from privatization (Richter/Portugall 2008: 152). Although in 
comparison to the USA the reliance on private security providers is up to now relatively 
restricted in scale in Germany (Petersohn 2006), their employment remains for legal and 
political reasons controversial, all the more since high expectations of cost savings have 
not been fulfilled (Branović/Chojnacki 2007: 66). 
Given this limited significance of privatization in the transformation of the German 
armed forces, we focus in the following on the broader directions of the transformation 
project and the changing semantics that has paved its way. Due to Germany’s Nazi past, 
its territorial division and location as a ‘front state’ during the Cold War, and due to 
completely altered international expectations after unification, the transformation of the 
German Bundeswehr into an interventionist army has been taking place in a quite 
unique domestic and international setting, posing special challenges some of which are 
briefly sketched below. Such special circumstances notwithstanding, the German case 
epitomizes the far-reaching effects of a further internationalization of Western security 
policies on domestic democratic control. 
                                                 
21  The foundation of the ‚Gesellschaft für Entwicklung, Beschaffung und Betrieb mbh’ (g.e.b.b.) in 2000 as an 
inhouse company of the Bundeswehr, which develops and implements privatization projects, was a visible indica-
tor for these cooperation efforts between military and private business. 
22  The Ministry of Defense includes in the ‚core capabilities’ of the Bundeswehr: effective armed forces, command 
capabilities, worldwide intelligence and reconnaissance, strategic deployment capabilities (cf. Petersohn 2006: 
12). 
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4.1 The Bundeswehr as an ‘army on operations’ 
After unification in 1990, Germany’s partners and allies in NATO and the European 
Union expected Germany to turn into a producer of international security and stop being 
a consumer only (Meiers 2002: 197). Resembling a political ‘salami tactics’, the Ger-
man government accustomed their public step by step to an expansion of the tasks of the 
Bundeswehr, starting with missions abroad declared as ‘humanitarian’ (Philippi 1997: 
52-58). The constitutional basis of these ‘out-of-area’ missions was quite controversial 
at that time since the German Basic Law had been interpreted for decades by many as 
forbidding the deployment of German armed forces beyond NATO territories. The 
highest German court, the Federal Constitutional Court, ruled in their so-called ‚out-of-
area’-judgment from 1994 this new deployment practice of the conservative-liberal coa-
lition government as constitutional, but stressed at the same time that the Bundeswehr is 
conceived of as a ‘parliament’s army’ and that a prior consent of the German parliament 
(Bundestag) is thus required before each deployment. In the meantime the Bundeswehr 
has conducted more than 40 out-of-area missions on three continents,23 and the 
Bundestag has given more than 60 times its consent to out-of-area mandates and their 
extension respectively (Wiefelspütz 2008: 242-255). However, the deployment law 
which the Federal Constitutional Court had called for in 1994, entered into force as late 
as March 2005. 
It was the left-wing coalition of Social Democrats (SPD) and Green Party who were 
during their two terms in office from 1998 to 2005 responsible for a large expansion of 
German engagements within international military actions. It is noteworthy that the in-
crease in intensity and scope of the military missions occurred without causing much 
protest from the German population who during the Cold War were considered as pre-
dominantly ‚pacifist’ (Wagener 2004). The participation in the NATO war against Ser-
bia-Montenegro in 1999 which lacked an explicit UN authorization marked a special 
turning point in this regard since it was the first involvement of the Bundeswehr in a 
war; the next combat mission followed in the Afghanistan war by the deployment of 
special ground forces (‘Kommando Spezialkräfte’). It was then in autumn 2001 that the 
Social-Democratic Chancellor Gerhard Schröder publicly prided himself in having 
lifted the German post-war ’taboo’ on military means in politics during his term in of-
fice (cf. Geis 2008). 
The unification of Germany and the ensuing increasing participation in military mis-
sions posed special challenges for the Bundeswehr in terms of a transformation process 
since it had been designed as a strictly defensive army during the Cold war. The 
                                                 
23  For a record of these missions since 1990 see the special issue of the journal Welttrends on ‘Military Power Ger-
many?’, vol. 15, No. 56, 2007, pp. 89-92. 
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Bundeswehr was not only supposed to develop into the all-German ‘army of (internal) 
unity’ but also into an ‘army on operations’ capable of interventions abroad. After 1990, 
the former East German armed forces (Nationale Volksarmee) had to be ‚wound off‘and 
the number of military staff from then nearly 500.000 persons (or more precise 583.000 
persons from both armies) had to be reduced under the maximum of 370.000 persons. 
Hence alterations within the command and control design as well as the differentiation 
of the structure of the armed forces were the central tasks of the first restructuring phase 
up to 1997 (Meiers 2006: 318-325). The decreasing defense budget and the gross im-
balance between high operational costs and low investment expenses tightly restricted 
the scope of these changes. Against this background, Minister of Defense Rudolf 
Scharping (SPD) attempted from 1998 onwards to make the Bundeswehr in spite of 
these monetary restrictions compatible for their mission tasks within the frameworks of 
NATO and the EU by way of reallocations within the defense budget, rationalization 
measures and ‚public-private-partnerships’ (PPPs) between the military and private 
business (von Bredow 2000: 149).  
However, the most decisive impulses for the transformation of the Bundeswehr were 
given as late as 2002 with the new Defense Minister Peter Struck (SPD) assuming of-
fice. In May 2003 he issued new Defense Policy Guidelines which underlined that the 
mission range of the Bundeswehr had fundamentally changed and now also encom-
passes – always conducted within multinational frameworks – international crisis pre-
vention, crisis management and the fight against terrorism.24 Until 2010, the size of the 
‚army on operations’ will be cut down on 250.000 troops, and the forces will be restruc-
tured into the three categories of response forces (35.000 soldiers) for multinational 
high-intensity operations, stabilization forces (70.000 soldiers) for peace stabilization 
measures in low- and medium-intensity operations, and support forces (147.500 sol-
diers) to assist all operations and ensure routine duty operations at home. The Ministry 
of Defense expressly conceives of this ‚transformation’ as a permanent change of the 
armed forces which implies much more than its mere ‚reform’ (cf. Richter 2007a: 103). 
Minister Struck defined ‚transformation’ as: 
                                                 
24  As a critical student of the military concluded, the new Defense Policy Guidelines ‚really finished with the old 
Bundeswehr’ (Bald 2005: 171; our translation). The external trigger were the terrorist attacks from September 11, 
2001, which entailed the ‚global war on terror’ proclaimed by the US administration. This ‘war on terror’ not 
only influenced the security concepts of NATO and EU, but also resulted in new military actions such as in Af-
ghanistan, where Germany participated. But also internal factors such as the relative failure of Scharping’s priva-
tization and economizing plans enhanced the pressure on the Schröder government to push ahead with the 
Bundeswehr transformation (Dyson 2007: 119-143). 
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„The continuous adaptation of the capabilities to changing security threats and new 
military requirements, the systematic use of innovations in technology, the increased 
integration, networking and synergy of concepts, training, material and technologies.” 
(Struck 2005: 12; our translation) 
The restructuring process is in its programmatic parts as well as in its rather delayed 
practical implementation25 dedicated to the improvement of efficiency and effectiveness 
of the armed forces. Two central elements in this regard are the ‚network-based conduct 
of operations’ and the ‚economic modernization’ of the Bundeswehr (Richter 2007). 
Closely following the US concept of ‚network centric warfare’, the German concept 
of network-based conduct of operations is intended to enhance the combat power by 
systematically networking all elements of reconnaissance, command and weapons effect 
(Lange 2004). The physical linking of all platforms and units of the armed forces via 
information networks is dependent on their ‚interoperability’. The comprehensive net-
working into a well co-ordinated ‚system of systems’ is then supposed to generate in-
formation and command superiority over the adversary. An improved intelligence shall 
augment the effectiveness of military operations tremendously by significantly reducing 
the time span between reconnaissance, decision, and action, and by multiplying combat 
speed (Fitschen 2006: 169).  
In order to make the armed forces more effective, the Bundeswehr recently created 
new command and control structures such as the joint command headquarters in Pots-
dam, the joint command information system (respectively the Army command informa-
tion system) and procured new equipment and weapons platforms based on state-of-the-
art technology (Fitschen 2006: 171-176; Collmer 2007). A key project of the Army is 
the ‘Future Infantry Soldier’, which is a modern kit for ground forces. The Army has 
been gradually equipped with this kit since 2005 and it has been used in missions in 
Kosovo and Afghanistan. The kit consists of about twenty modern technology-based 
components from the segments clothing, personal equipment, electronics, optronics and 
armament, which is meant to enhance each soldier’s survivability, command and sus-
tainability capabilities. 
The transformation of the Bundeswehr does not only refer to the restructuring and the 
high-tech armament of the armed forces units but also to the ‘economic modernization’ 
of the Bundeswehr administration. As in other Western militaries, in addition to the 
military terminology another ‚language’ spread in the Bundeswehr which is based on 
concepts and methods from managerial economics and business administration: ‚Terms 
                                                 
25  Mainly due to tight fiscal restraints, the realization of the transformation plans lags in many respects behind the 
proclamations and intentions of the Ministry of Defense (see e.g. Lange 2005). However, for the  purposes of our 
argument in this paper, these declared intentions as such are also of significance. 
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such as controlling, “cost accounting”, market-testing, balanced-scorecard, up to “qual-
ity management” and “customer orientation” are integral parts of the daily communica-
tion also within the Bundeswehr“ (Richter/Portugall 2008: 149; our translation). Similar 
to other public sectors of the OECD countries that have been transformed in the neo-
liberal spirit of new public management, the organization of the armed forces is also to 
become more efficient and effective so that this sector can cope with security challenges 
just as well as with financial budget challenges. 
In this vein, a concept of ‘cost accounting and results accounts responsibility’ has 
been developed for the Bundeswehr from the mid 1990s onwards, which aims at induc-
ing an altered thinking within the armed forces promoting an economizing handling of 
resources. ‘Careless’ use of taxpayers’ money, inefficient structures and bureaucratic 
slack should be overcome. ‘Economization became a code for a change of paradigm 
within the Bundeswehr, for a new way of thinking, which ought to include criteria of 
rationality taken from business administration basically in all decision-making proc-
esses’ (Kantner/Richter 2004: 7; our translation). The concept of ‘cost accounting and 
results accounts responsibility’ consists of instructions on cost efficiency in the produc-
tion of all military and civil services, the joining of technical and resources responsibil-
ity, the creation of costs and production transparency as well as the tapping of creativity 
potentials by a so-called ‘continuous improvement program’ (Richter/Portugall 2008: 
152; Richter 2007). 
As has been shown, the transformation of the Bundeswehr is dominated by a seman-
tics of effectiveness, deployability, flexibility, mobility, and the like. However, what 
sounds like a profound restructuring of the armed forces arouses rather little interest in 
the German population. The Federal President Horst Köhler repeatedly complained 
about a ‘friendly indifference’ of the citizens towards ‚their’ armed forces and their mis-
sions abroad (Geis 2007). This can hardly surprise given the fact that political decision-
makers, notwithstanding their own proclamations to the contrary, have not been able to 
or not willing to launch a major public debate on the German security policy and the 
role of the armed forces in particular. The transformation of the Bundeswehr has thus up 
to date not been sufficiently reflected in a comprehensive debate, but instead it is geared 
predominantly towards parameters of effectiveness and efficiency, with reference to 
putative necessities.  
While neither the non-existence of a critical awareness of citizens nor the absence of 
a major political debate per se is necessarily a sign of a democratic deficit but could also 
be read as an indicator of general indifference or of acquiescence, it is still noteworthy 
that the transformation process has been changing the terms of the political discourse as 
such. In the light of an enhanced participation in international military actions, ‘output’ 
legitimacy aspects of the German interventionist army and their missions have now 
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gained more attention than the formerly central ‘input’ legitimacy issues of the ‘civiliza-
tion’ of the (self defense) army and its democratic control. Although this gradual shift 
within discourse (and practice) is in our view not to be understood as a looming remili-
tarization of German foreign policy, it is still striking since the elite of the ‚old’ Federal 
Republic of Germany used to point out proudly the special provisions in the German 
civil-military relations, the firm integration of the armed forces into the society and the 
democratic control of the troops (von Bredow 2000). Such a shift in emphasis hence 
raises questions on the appropriate balance between democratic accountability and mili-
tary effectiveness. 
That such questions gain new momentum can be outlined by the guiding principle 
‘Innere Führung’26 which is a key element of the ‚civilization’ of the German army, de-
veloped in the 1950s. This concept postulates that democratic ideas and military neces-
sities can be harmonized with each other, that central norms of the German Basic Law 
such as human dignity, basic rights and the rule of law must be fully applied to the mili-
tary. In conjunction with the conscription this professional ethics code is thought to in-
spire a ‚citizen in uniform’ who acts in a responsible manner, who respects the norms 
and values of the Basic Law, and who on his (her) part can claim his (her) own rights in 
the military according to the constitution (Hartmann 2007). The normative concept of 
‘Innere Führung’ has since its inception met with resistance from within the military, 
and its implementation remains a challenge to date since there is a fundamental tension 
between military efficiency and democratic requirements. In recent years, however, the 
concept came under particular reform pressure through the Bundeswehr missions abroad 
(Wiesendahl 2005); some observers claim that it has been eroded especially since the 
1990s und worry about a potential future dominance of a ‚combat soldier type’ in the 
German armed forces (Bald 2002: 103f). It also seems that the whole discourse on ‚In-
nere Führung’ might be replaced in the long run by the image of a ‘technocrat in uni-
form’ (Groß 2005: 57f, 71). Both developments would not further the democratic con-
trol and societal integration of the troops. 
4.2 The Internationalization of German Security Policy:  
The example of the ESDP 
The democratic control of German security policy has come under pressure in particular 
by the trend of internationalization, which we analyze in this paper with regard to the 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). In the aftermath of the Kosovo war and 
the terrorist attacks from September 11, 2001, the military integration of the EU has 
made considerable advances due to several initiatives by France, Great Britain and 
                                                 
26  No official translation available from the Ministry of Defense. 
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Germany: In December 1999 the EU member states agreed in Helsinki on the Headline 
Goals 2003 which committed the EU to setting up crisis intervention forces which shall 
be deployed in cases where the NATO as a whole decides not to engage. The goal was 
to provide for quick reaction forces which are capable of covering the full mission range 
of the so-called ‚Petersberg tasks’, i.e. humanitarian and rescue missions, peace keep-
ing, peace enforcement and combat missions. The EU member states pledged to ear-
mark by 2003 the size of 50.000 to 60.000 troops which are capable of conducting the 
full spectrum of the Petersberg tasks, which can be deployed rapidly within 60 days and 
which must be able to sustain for at least one year27 (Wagner 2004: 2). The German con-
tribution to these Headline Goals designates 30.000 soldiers, 90 fighter aircrafts and 15 
vessels. 
In 2004 the EU re-examined these agreements and decreed the adjusted Headline 
Goals 2010, which provided, among others, for the establishment of so-called ‘battle 
groups’. This concept of battle groups, that had been developed in the light of the EU’s 
recent experience of their first own autonomous military operation ‘Artemis’ in Congo 
in 2003, refers to troops which must be highly flexible and available at very short notice 
and which shall be deployed primarily at the request of the United Nations. A battle 
group consists of 1.500 soldiers who ought to be ready for deployment within five to ten 
days and be able to sustain for a minimum of 30 days. Their mission tasks include the 
‚Petersberg missions’ but also the additional tasks laid down in the European Security 
Strategy from 2003, which comprise joint disarmament operations as well as the assis-
tance of non-EU countries in combating terrorism and in reforming their security sector. 
The battle groups have reached full operational readiness in 2007; Germany participates 
on a regular basis in these units, which are kept on ‚stand-by’ (Lindstrom 2007: 13-19, 
88). 
The battle group concept is especially relevant for the issue of domestic democratic 
control since it is linked to a very short notice availability of troops, which poses a chal-
lenge not only to the rather lengthy decision-making processes at the European level but 
also to such member states as Germany that have institutionalized substantial parlia-
mentary oversight powers in the deployment of armed troops (Lindstrom 2007: 30f.). It 
is rather unlikely that a member state which at a time of a crisis is contributing troops to 
a ‘stand-by’ battle group would actually withdraw its troops since this would entail the 
                                                 
27  At the Capabilities Commitment Conference of November 2000 the EU member states agreed on the earmarking 
of 100.000 personnel, 400 combat aircraft and 100 vessels that provide a pool for the deployment of rapid reac-
tion capabilities. Parallel to this setting up of military capabilities, the EU also pursues the development of its 
civil crisis intervention capabilities, which in the meantime have been deployed in 13 civil ESDP missions. These 
civil operations are not subject of our analysis, but see e.g. Rummel (2008). 
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collapse of the whole operation (Peters et al. 2008: 13). In this vein, for example Hans-
Ulrich Klose, Social-Democratic member of the German parliament and deputy chair-
man of the Foreign Committee, argues that for reasons of ‚alliance reliability’ special 
rules of parliamentary decision-making for the EU battle groups (and the NATO Re-
sponse Force) were required: ‘It must be secured that in a case of a negative vote of the 
parliament the German soldiers will remain within the integrated troops unit’ (Klose 
2007: 26; our translation).28 
Neither the EU response forces nor the battle groups have been deployed to date but 
still the EU has already conducted 23 ESDP missions since 2003, six of which are mili-
tary missions,29 among others in Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Congo, and re-
cently it started its civil rule of law mission ‘EULEX’ in Kosovo and its military opera-
tion ‘Atalanta’ for the deterrence and repression of acts of piracy off the Somali coast. It 
is noteworthy that ‘(s)ome EU operations in the meantime have a much more substantial 
military clout than common UN operations, although the EU has not yet conducted a 
robust comprehensive military intervention to enforce peace’ (Mayer/Weinlich 2008: 
105; our translation). 
The increasing adoption of civil and military tasks has significant consequences for 
the internal decision-making structure of the EU. Formally, the intergovernmental char-
acter of the European security policy remains unchanged, i.e. the individual member 
states retain their legal competencies, but the informal influence of supranational agen-
cies such as the Commission and of hybrid agencies such as the Council Secretariat has 
been growing in the fields of planning and organization of the ESDP missions 
(Mayer/Weinlich 2008: 97-105). Thus although the member states’ national monopolies 
of force may not be undermined by internationalization, the negative impact on the do-
mestic democratic control of security policy is considerable (Anghel et al. 2008; Peters 
et al. 2008), as can be illustrated at the example of Germany.  
To be sure, Germany belongs to the group of EU member states that have institution-
alized relatively strong parliamentary oversight powers in the deployment and control of 
armed forces (Wagner 2006; Wiefelspütz 2008), but it can be shown with many de-
ployments during the last years that the decisions to participate had actually already 
been taken by the government during international negotiations before the parliament 
                                                 
28  Since this suggestion of introducing ‘special rules’ for ‘special cases’ by Hans-Ulrich Klose refers up to now  to a 
hypothetical case (there has been no negative vote of the parliament so far), it remains to be seen how the German 
parliament and public would actually react in such an instance. Still, the statement as such and its underlying rea-
soning, put forward by a significant speaker in the German security discourse, is important for our argument. 
29  See for the civil, military and civil-military ESDP operations <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268 
&lang=en> [accessed on January, 30, 2009]. 
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and the public could debate them.30 It should be noted that the members of the 
Bundestag readily accept the prerogative of the executive in this field as inevitable 
(Klose 2007: 26; Anghel et al. 2008: 64); this executive prerogative has also been con-
firmed by the Federal Constitutional Court in several rulings (Gareis 2006: 40-43). Both 
the pressure within the parliamentary parties to appear as a united group, loyal to one’s 
government in a sensitive political matter as well as to one’s soldiers, and an under-
standing of putative international ‚necessities’ such as ‚alliance solidarity’ lead a major-
ity of the Bundestag to support the prior international commitments of the government. 
Further internationalization and an increasing complexity of decision-making subjects 
and contexts that comes along with it exacerbate the factual imbalance between the 
German executive and legislative in military deployment issues. Hence the formally 
considerable oversight powers of the parliament are not fully utilized due to ‚faits ac-
complis’ set by the government and due to a general solidarity with one’s soldiers (cf. 
Rosenow 2008: 101-117).  
In conclusion, it can be summarized that the transformation of the Bundeswehr as 
well as the ever deeper integration of the German military into international security 
structures in fact contribute to a further strengthening of the executive and may thus 
undermine domestic democratic control by the public and the legislative, which has 
despite existing formal powers been limited in practice anyway. The common emphasis 
on ‘output’ aspects such as effectiveness, deployability, flexibility and rapidity further 
diminishes the value of democratic processes whose characteristic slowness seems to be 
a hindrance for such aspirations. 
5. TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE STATE MONOPOLY OF FORCE?  
SECURING THE STATE, UNDERMINING DEMOCRACY 
As the examples of the United States and Germany have shown, the restructuring 
strategies in the core of Western security politics reveal some astonishing similarities. 
At first glance, the transformation of the German armed forces and the outsourcing ini-
tiative of the US military seem to indicate two disparate responses to a changing inter-
national security setting after the end of the Cold War (as described in section 2). Yet, 
both have similar effects: national executives manage to increase their autonomy vis-à-
vis their parliaments and their publics. It could be argued that a form of a new raison 
d’etat, as Klaus Dieter Wolf has termed it once (Wolf 2000), is materializing also in this 
delicate policy field, resulting in a gradual erosion of democratic control. Such a gain of 
executive autonomy and discretionary power can be observed both in the transformation 
                                                 
30  Cf. for the decision on the participation of the Bundeswehr in the EU mission EUFOR RD Congo in 2006 
Schmidt (2007), Dembinski/Förster (2007: 22, 27). 
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of the Bundeswehr and the deliberate self-binding of German security policy to interna-
tional organizations such as the EU and NATO. Complementarily, the outsourcing 
strategies of the US government can be interpreted as an intentional un-binding and 
informalization to secure the same effect.  
As also Philipp Genschel and Bernhard Zangl (2008) argue in their reflections on the 
transformation of the state from a monopolist of political authority to a manager of po-
litical authority, we are witnessing a novel governance technique of Western states in 
the core fields of security – however, as we have shown above, it is a technique which 
entails questionable effects in normative as well as in practical regards. Still, it should 
be stressed that speaking of a ‘technique’ does not mean that malevolent Western gov-
ernments collude in a conspiracy to enhance their discretionary powers and flexibility 
vis-à-vis legislatures and democratic publics. The undermining of democratic control is 
only partly caused by intentional strategies. To some extent it is also a side effect of 
structural developments in an expanding field of international security. Increasing com-
plexity of security issues brought about by a growing number of international actors, 
organizations and institutions produces structural effects and unintended consequences 
which altogether threaten the maintenance of domestic democratic control. National 
executives, though not intentionally causing all these effects, still benefit from such 
structural changes in terms of a domestic empowerment and should thus not be expected 
to actively reverse them. 
In analyzing the effects of privatization and internationalization on the state monop-
oly of force and its domestic democratic control, one should distinguish not only inten-
tional from unintended consequences but also short-term and long-term effects. This is 
most relevant for the privatization strategy which in a short-term perspective does not 
imply a decline of significance of the state. Governments utilize it as a flexible tool of 
governance in order to increase their autonomy in decision-making. In the long run, 
however, this strategy might boomerang. Even if one agrees with Dieter Grimm that the 
state monopoly of force is sufficiently protected as long as the state controls the condi-
tions under which private agents exercise force on behalf of it (Grimm 2002: 1305), the 
discussion on privatization within the US military highlights how difficult it is to con-
trol these conditions. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have created a boost for out-
sourcing, which entails an increasing loss of control and beginning dependencies of the 
military on PSMCs in some critical areas which could undermine any short term gain in 
flexibility and the executives’ autonomy in the long run. 
With respect to the transformation of the Bundeswehr, one might both in a short-term 
and a long-term perspective well advocate this ‘modernization process’ as it is intended 
to improve the security protection of the country. However, the defense of national terri-
tories has not been the primary mission of the majority of military operations of West-
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 92) 
- 25 - 
ern democracies since the end of the Cold War. Instead, they reflect an altered under-
standing of military violence as a means of global governance and world order politics 
(Duffield 2001; Brock 2004). Even if the ‘lifting of the taboo on military force’ – as the 
former German Chancellor Schröder had described his left-wing government’s 
achievement in recent German military affairs – is not a direct or singular effect of this 
weakening of democratic constraints on the use of force, the latter might very well con-
tribute to and further fuel it.  
To be sure, trends of de-parliamentarisation and self-empowerment of executives are 
visible in many policy fields, but in the delicate field of security, i.e. the use of force, 
‘scenarios of self-programming executive bodies [Gubernativen]’ (Eberl/Fischer-
Lescano 2005: 3, our translation) give rise to rather worrying prospects. The govern-
mental rhetoric of inevitable structural adjustments within security politics has the po-
tential to lead to a transformation of the state in the long run, if and when the balance 
between executives and legislatures continues tipping towards the former.  
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